The cogito of Descartes as an extreme resumption of “know thyself”
Vol 10, No 1 (2009) • Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
Autor: Miguel Spinelli
Resumo:
The goal of the article is to analyze the cogito (the epistemic presupposition of Descartes’ science) from a very specific point of view: as an extreme resumption of know thyself, the maxim that originated and stirred philosophizing in its beginning. The article takes as a reference La Recherche de la Verité, a dialogue Descartes wrote in 1641, right after the Meditations. The truth alluded to refers, on the one hand, to the precepts of science, that is, to what about things and phenomena we can objectively affirm as constituting knowledge; on the other hand, to the knowing subject, in relation to which the cogito, beyond overcoming doubt (pertaining to knowledge in general), has the role of rescuing the I in its own singularity: as the objective, human I, naturally given to self-knowledge as a knowing subject.
ISSN: ISSN: 1984-8234
Texto Completo: http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/5003
Palavras-Chave: Descartes,cogito, truth,knowledge,science
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