On the intentionality-relative features of the world
Vol 17, No 2 (2016) • Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
Autor: Rodrigo A. dos S. Gouvea
Resumo:
Many things we deal with in our daily lives seem to be products of our mental, intentional states. John Searle (1996, 2010) defended this thesis, and offered a characterization of the “intentionality-relative features of the world”. The present paper aims at contributing to our understanding of the nature of such entities. It presents and criticises Searle’s claims on the general properties of the intentionality-relative features of the world. An original characterization is offered in the paper, as a consequence of modifications I suggest making to Searle’s account, mainly in respect to the epistemological status of such entities.
ISSN: ISSN: 1984-8234
Texto Completo: http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.172.09
Palavras-Chave: intentionality,intentionality-relative featur
Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
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