Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge
Vol 17, No 3 (2016) • Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
Autor: Art?rs Logins
Resumo:
According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about evidence.
ISSN: ISSN: 1984-8234
Texto Completo: http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.173.06
Palavras-Chave: functions of evidence,E=K,evidential probabil
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