Issues for Lowe’s dualist view on agents
Vol 17, No 3 (2016) • Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
Autor: Beatriz Sorrentino Marques
Resumo:
E.J. Lowe (2008) proposes a dualist conception of agents. He grounds his dualist view on the Unity Argument, which I claim relies on unwarranted presuppositions about the agent and, therefore, cannot support his view. This is a problem for Lowe’s account of actions as well, because his account relies on his dualist view of agents.
ISSN: ISSN: 1984-8234
Texto Completo: http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.173.13
Palavras-Chave: Agents,dualism,mental states
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