Debunking and fully apt belief
Vol 19, No 3 (2018) • Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
Autor: Joshua C. Thurow
Resumo:
One of the contentious philosophical issues surrounding the cognitive science of religion (CSR) is whether well-confirmed CSR theories would debunk religious beliefs. These debates have been contentious in part because of criticisms of epistemic principles used in debunking arguments. In this paper I use Ernest Sosa’s respected theory of knowledge as fully apt belief—which avoids objections that have been leveled against sensitivity and safety principles often used in debunking arguments—to construct a plausible debunking argument for religious belief on the assumption that religious belief is formed simply through processes theorized by CSR. But, in fact, most believers also rely on arguments of various sorts, and their beliefs are not debunked.
ISSN: ISSN: 1984-8234
Texto Completo: http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2018.193.11
Palavras-Chave: debunking argument,cognitive science of relig
Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
The journal Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy is published once every four months by Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos.
Articles must be original, unpublished, and not under consideration for publication anywhere else and can be written in Portuguese, English or Spanish
Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy prints articles, translations and critical book reviews. It also reprints papers that are considered fundamental to the area when authorized written permission is given by the original publisher.